![]() ![]() “None of us has ever worked on anything this ambitious.” We barely made it, and I think if we didn’t have the demo, we wouldn’t have made it. We felt the pain of the demo after the Kickstarter ended.įor about 3 months, we were still fixing bugs and errors that were caused because we were rushing.Īt the same time, I think it’s the thing that allowed us to push through. However, it’s kind of like a party, in the sense that after it’s done, you have to clean up. It’s kind of fun to write code like that, in a sort of irresponsible way. On the one hand it was good, it was fun writing really bad code as fast as you can, just to get it out the door. ![]() We threw out our previous plans out the door and we rushed to make a playable demo for the Kickstarter. We knew that we had to make a playable demo to stir interest in the game. I tried to shield the rest of the team from the Kickstarter as much as I could at the time, but we realized the campaign slowed down right in the middle of it––no new pledges, all the page views stopped––it was really discouraging and we weren’t sure that we were going to make it anymore. We didn’t want to rush things or go into crunch or anything crazy just because of the Kickstarter, we wanted it to be business as usual. The game didn’t have a demo, and we thought that if we just kept working on the game, it would be okay that we didn’t have a demo during the Kickstarter. Our first week of crowdfunding went really well, and by all indicators it looked like would have a successful ending, so everyone was really hopeful.īut at the same time, there was so much to do. We had a lot of people helping us out with PR and marketing to get the campaign going. We were very hopeful at the start, we had done our homework and spent a lot of time researching what to do. We were funded in the final days of the Kickstarter. I hope I don’t have to go through anything like that ever again. It was really good and we’re really grateful, our backers are sweethearts and we owe so much to them, but the actual experience of running the campaign was by far, the most anxiety inducing, hair pulling stress I’ve ever had in my entire career. “We were funded in the final days of the Kickstarter.”Įven though we got over 100% funding on Kickstarter, I wouldn’t call the campaign successful. We’ve been working on Relic Hunters Legend now for about two years. That’s when Rogue Snail actually got started as a company. It ended up having millions of players, which caught us off guard.Īfter that we decided we should do a serious Relic Hunters game that could actually make some money. Relic Hunters Zero was a surprising success, it was something we did just for fun, we released it for free, open source. This indie label was basically just me for a while, Rogue Snail wasn’t a company for the first couple of years. ![]() We don’t have the same central hubs like San Francisco, Austin, or Vancouver––these cities where everyone in gaming tends to gather. Since we’re fully remote, I chose the name Rogue Snail because they carry their houses on their backs.īrazil is such a huge country, and every time we wanted to work with someone, the person would be hundreds of miles away. Most of the CEOs I know here in Brazil have big offices, so we’re very different. We have fourteen people on full time, we’re fully remote. My name is Mark, I’m the game designer on Relic Hunters Legend and I’m the CEO of Rogue Snail. He also shared some insight into Rogue Snail’s community development for the game, some of the challenges they’ve faced as a team, and talks about what it’s like to make your dream game. In this week’s blog post, Mark Venturelli of Rogue Snail discusses what it’s like to develop a game as big as Relic Hunters Legend. ![]()
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